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THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION: IS THE
UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM
SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY THE
BEGINNING OF THE END?
James J. Kinneally III*
INTRODUCTION
The increasing number of terrorist attacks over the past several years
have caused heightened concern throughout the world about the inter-
national community's ability to maintain world order. One solution pro-
posed to limit and discourage such attacks is greater recourse to the
ancient process of extradition.1 Extradition is the process of returning
accused criminals found in a foreign state to the state seeking prosecu-
tion.' In the absence of extradition, terrorists avoid prosecution for
crimes by seeking refuge in foreign countries that do not sanction ex-
traterritorial crimes.' Many countries will only extradite individuals
pursuant to specific treaty obligations." Consequently, terrorists who es-
* J.D., 1987, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971) [hereinafter I.
SHEARER] (discussing the oldest known extradition provision in a peace treaty that
called for the return of criminals of one party found in the territory of another). This
treaty was concluded in 1280 B.C. between Egyptian Pharoah Ramses II and the Hit-
tite Prince Hattusili. Id.
2. 6 M. WHITEMtAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 727 (1968) [hereinafter M.
WHITEMAN]; see 1 M. BASsIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1-1 (1983) [hereinafter M. BASsIOUNI, UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE] (defining extradition as several processes in which one sovereign sur-
renders an accused criminal or fugitive offender to another sovereign).
3. Proposed Ratification of the Supplementary Treaty: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1985) (statement of Abra-
ham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the State Department) [hereinafter Sofaer]; see
Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFt'. 901-02 (1986) (addressing problems
associated with sanctioning terrorism).
4. See 1 M. BAssiouNi, UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2. at 2, §
2 (discussing the two predominant views on duty to extradite). Bassiouni notes that
Puffendorf and Billot consider extradition a moral obligation that requires an explicit
agreement or "contract" in order to be binding. Id. Bassiouni also discusses the Gro-
tius-deVattel school of extradition that finds that the refugee state has a legal duty
under international law to either return the accused persons to the requesting state, or
punish them itself. Id. Bassiouni maintains that current practice favors the Puffendorf
and Billot view, but that some states regard comity as a legally sufficient basis for
extradition. Id; see also I. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that most common law
countries will not extradite an offender without a prior treaty obligation); S. BEDI,
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 33-48 (1968) [hereinafter S.
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cape to countries without extradition treaties easily avoid prosecution.
Because extradition treaties are cumbersome, time consuming instru-
ments to negotiate, terrorist attacks that prompt negotiations of such
treaties remain undeterred during the years required for negotiation
and implementation.
An additional problem with using extradition to prosecute terrorists
is that extradition treaties explicitly excuse individuals accused of polit-
ical offenses.5 The majority of terrorist attacks are committed in order
to attain a political goal. Consequently, terrorists often invoke the polit-
ical offense exceptions to extradition treaties, avoiding extradition to
jurisdictions where the alleged acts occur.
On June 8, 1972, the United States and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed an Extradition Treaty.' The
Treaty included a standard political offense exception.7 To address con-
cerns over the ability of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
members to invoke the political offense exception, the two nations
signed a Supplementary Treaty8 on June 25, 1985. The Supplementary
Treaty narrows the definition of a political offense under the 1972 Ex-
tradition Agreement, significantly reducing terrorists' recourse to the
political offense exception. 9
This Comment examines the historical and philosophical underpin-
BEDI] (discussing the various foundations of extradition including treaties and laws); 6
M. WHITEMAN, supra note 2, at 727 (outlining the duty to extradite in absence of a
treaty obligation and the legal basis that various governments use to support the
practice).
5. See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United Kingdom-United States, art. V, §
1(c), 28 U.S.T. 227, 230, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty] (setting
forth the political offense exception).
6. Extradition Treaty, supra note 5.
7. Id. Article V of the Treaty states, in pertinent part, that extradition shall not be
granted if:
(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested
party as one of a political character; or
(ii) the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has in fact
been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political
character.
Id.
8. Supplementary Treaty Concerning The Extradition Treaty Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britian and Northern Ireland, S. Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
[hereinafter Supplementary Treaty]. The United States Senate overwhelmingly ap-
proved the Supplementary Treaty by a vote of 87-10 on July 17, 1986. N.Y. Times,
July 18, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
9. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 8, at arts. 2-5. Articles 2 through 5 apply,
respectively, to the following: the statute of limitations; submission of evidence; treaty
retroactivity; and territorial applicability. Id; see also infra note 112 (listing crimes no
longer includable under the political offense exception of the 1972 Extradition Treaty).
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nings of the political offense exception. In addition, this Comment ana-
lyzes the Supplementary Treaty's restriction on the applicability of the
political offense exception by examining the underlying rationale of the
exception. Finally, this Comment discusses two recommendations for
revision of the political offense exception.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE EXCEPTION
A. ORIGINS OF THE EXCEPTION
The political offense exception has not always been a facet of extra-
dition. From the thirteenth century, B.C., to the eighteenth century,
A.D., extradition specifically targeted individuals suspected of religious
or political offenses against sovereigns." Prior to the eighteenth cen-
tury, the escape of common criminals was not considered a public dan-
ger necessitating extradition."" Sovereigns, however, did seek prosecu-
tion for crimes against the state and actively pursued offenders who
escaped."2 Many fleeing offenders were captured by medieval despots,
eager to surrender mutual political adversaries to solidify political
power.1" Consequently, extradition treaties developed as a means of fa-
cilitating the return of suspected political offenders.
During the eighteenth century, political offenders' status underwent
a metamorphasis. Increasing acceptance of the right to dissent and re-
spect for personal liberty were hallmarks of the American Revolution1'
10. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRA-
DITION 5 (1980) [hereinafter C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT] (discussing the rationale sup-
porting early instances of extradition for political offenses); see also I. SHEARER, supra
note 1, at 165-66 (explaining the insufficiency of ancient extradition practices and the
formulation of more recent extradition doctrines). But see S. BEDI, supra note 4. at 16
(noting studies that show early extraditions were not limited to political crimes).
11. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 5-6 (noting that prior to the
eighteenth century sovereigns were not concerned with extradition of common
criminals, but did pursue those committing crimes against the state). But see S. BEDi,
supra note 4, at 16 (noting that the practice of extraditing common criminals may have
developed simultaneously with the extradition of political criminals).
12. See Note, State Department Determination of Political Offenders: Death Knell
for the Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
137, 138 (1983) [hereinafter Note, State Department Determination] (discussing the
historical development of extradition as a function of the exigencies of maintaining
eighteenth century sovereignty). But cf. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 5
(noting that few common criminals chose to flee their native countries because of the
lack of social and political privileges abroad).
13. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 16 (discussing asylum, extradi-
tion, and diplomatic relations among medieval sovereigns); id. at 5-6 (discussing trea-
ties that require the return of all traitors).
14. See The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776) (declaring that
whenever government becomes destructive of the ends, the people possess the right to
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and were advocated by such writers as John Locke1" and J. S. Mill.1 6
Other factors that influenced the political offense exception's develop-
ment include: (1) a growing reluctance to engage in "victor's justice";
17
(2) an increasing respect for due process rights of individuals;18 and (3)
an unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.1 "
The political changes of the eighteenth century, therefore, marked the
transformation of the political offense into a "nonextraditable offense
par excellence."
20
The political offense exception was first codified in the Belgium Ex-
tradition Act of October 1, 183321 and was included in a treaty be-
tween France and Belgium the following year.22 Over the next several
alter or abolish it).
15. See J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 18-19 (E. Barker ed. 1960) (maintaining that the people have
the right to overthrow governments that abuse power).
16. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (C. Shields ed. 1956). In this work, Mill stated:
The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits on the power which the ruler
should be suffered to exercise over the community; and the limitation was what
they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recog-
nition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights which it was re-
garded as a breach of duty of the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe,
specific resistance or general rebellion was held to be justifiable.
Id. at 4. Mill discusses the growing acceptance of the removal of people's delegates and
magistrates at the pleasure of the citizens. Id. Mill concludes that the ability to remove
government officials is necessary for citizens to have complete security that governmen-
tal power is not "abused to their disadvantage." Id. at 5.
17. Extradition, Political Crimes, and the U.K. Treaty: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985) (testimony of
Prof. Christopher H. Pyle) [hereinafter Pyle]. Under the concept of "victor's justice," a
nation may refuse to extradite a revolutionary "merely because he had the misfortune
to fail." Note, State Department Determination, supra note 12, at 139.
18. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 3 (listing the three components
of the rationale behind the political offense exception). The first component is the hu-
manitarian interest in preventing a state from commencing unfair trial proceedings
against a given revolutionary. Id.; see also M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADI-
TION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 425 (1975) [hereinafter M. BASSIOUNI, WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER] (noting the inherent unfairness in judicial proceedings of a state
against its rebels).
19. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271
(1986). The court in Quinn stated three rationales behind the political offense excep-
tion: (1) the belief that citizens may actively attempt to change their political systems;
(2) the desire to prevent a government from retaliating against an individual for his
political beliefs; and (3) the general principle that governments should not interfere in
the domestic political struggles of other countries. Id.
20. M. BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 18, at 371.
21. 8 BULLETIN OFFICIEL DEs LoIs ET ARRETE ROYAUX DE LA BELGIQUE 1195
(1833).
22. Treaty of 22 November 1834, Belgium-France, art. 5, 10 BULLETIN OFnCIEL
DEs Lois ET ARRETES ROYAUX DE LA BELGIQUE 963 (1834), cited in I. SHEARER,
supra note 1, at 167 n.2; see C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 13 (reproduc-
ing a portion of the Belgian Extradition Act of 1833 and noting that the Act prohibits
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decades, France included the political offense exception in numerous
treaties with other states.23 Despite the codification of the political of-
fense exception in treaties and statutes, many nations considered the
exception self-evident and maintained that its codification was
unnecessary.24
B. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING A POLITICAL OFFENSE
Historically, the most fundamental problem in applying the political
offense exception is the lack of a clear definition of a political offense.2 5
Although many nineteenth century treaties incorporated the exception,
few clearly defined the parameters of a political offense.20 One attempt
to clarify the political offense exception was the attentat clause of the
1856 Belgian extradition law.27 The attentat clause specifically ex-
cluded assassination attempts on heads of states from political offense
the prosecution of foreigners for political offenses before extradition).
23. I. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 167 (listing French extradition agreements con-
cluded in the 19th century that included the political offense exception).
24. Letter of Mr. Fish to Mr. Hoffman, May 22, 1876 FOREIGN REL 233, 237
(1876); 4 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 604, at 334 (1906) (reprinting
the text of a letter from Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, to Great Britain's Secretary
of State Wickham Hoffman regarding codification of the political offense exception).
The letter states:
Neither the extradition clause in the treaty of 1794, nor in that of 1842 con-
tains any reference to immunity for political offenses, or to the protection of
asylum for political or religious refugees. The public sentiment of both countries
made it unnecessary. Between the United States and Great Britain it was not
supposed, on either side, that guarantees were required of each other against a
thing inherently impossible, anymore than, by the laws of Solon, was a punish-
ment deemed necessary against the crime of parricide, which was beyond the
possibility of contemplation.
Id.
25. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 95-102. The concept of a political
offense is fluid and changes with each factual situation. Id. at 95. What is considered
an offense of political nature under some circumstances may not fall into that category
in subsequent situations. Id. If a treaty includes a formal and rigid definition of the
political offense that fails to allow for its elasticity, the parties can not compensate for
future refinements in the definition without negotiating an amendment to the treaty. Id.
at 97. Future developments may include new crimes such as terrorist attacks that are
not explicitly covered under many treaties. The absence of a limiting definition allows
parties to respond to developments as they present themselves, rather than going
through the cumbersome and time consuming negotiation and implementation process
for treaty amendment. Id. at 103. Consequently, the lack of a precise definition of
political offense presents both advantages and disadvantages to the extradition process.
26. I. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 168-69 (noting the difficulties involved in defining
the term "political" in treaties and legislation). The working definition is an elastic
concept that has developed through judicial decisions, the work of commentators and
the exercise of executive authority in response to the particular facts of each case,
rather than through treaty negotiation. Id. See supra note 25 (discussing the definition
of a political offense).
27. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 13.
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The absence of a uniform and precise definition of a political offense
continued through the twentieth century.29 Judicial and executive
branches have unsuccessfully attempted to draft a more precise and
uniform definition. 30 The Supplementary Treaty is representative of the
most recent attempt to rectify the definitional problem.
Political offenses are divisible into two categories, the pure political
offense and the relative political offense.31 The pure political offense
involves "conduct directed against the sovereign . . . that constitutes a
subjective threat to a political, religious or racial ideology, or its sup-
porting structures . . . without . . . any of the elements of a common
crime."' 32 Examples of pure political offenses include treason, sedition,
and espionage,3 but also include more passive forms of dissidence such
as disagreement with state or party ideology, or draft evasion.84 The
28. See id. at 136 (discussing the continuing controversy over the attentat clause).
Van den Wijngaert notes that scholars have criticized the clause for excluding all other
categories of political offense, except for assassinations of heads of state, from the defi-
nition of an extraditable offense. Id. Critics also contend that the attentat clause
broadly assumes that heads of state are innocent of wrongdoing. Id. Thus, critics con-
clude that the clause is both too narrow and too broad. Id.
29. Id. at 95-102.
30. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-
1983, 17 AKRON L. RaV. 495 (1984) (surveying recent congressional proposals on ex-
tradition and noting different positions taken by the Senate and the House on the polit-
ical offense exception); Note, Extradition Reform and the Statutory Definition of Po-
litical Offenses, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 419 (1984) (comparing legislative proposals of the
Senate and House with respect to extradition and political offenses); see also infra
notes 123-31 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial and executive branch roles
in the extradition process); Note, Terrorist Extradition and the Political Offense Ex-
ception: An Administrative Solution, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 163 (1980) (advocating legis-
lative changes to clarify both the definition and application of the political offense ex-
ception by the two branches). The Supplementary Treaty signifies the most recent
attempt to rectify the definitional problem. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying
text (discussing the provisions of the Supplementary Treaty regarding political
offenses).
31. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 105 (recognizing that political
offenses are either pure or relative).
32. M. BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 18, at 379 (emphasizing
that a pure political offense is a public, as opposed to a private wrong).
33. See id. at 380 (characterizing such crimes as a threat to the state and therefore
purely political).
34. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 107. These passive offenses are
often nonextraditable for an unrelated reason known as the principle of double crimi-
nality which is included in most extradition treaties. See Extradition Treaty, supra note
5, at art. III (1)(a) (providing that extradition is granted . . . if the offense is punisha-
ble under the laws of both parties). If the act does not constitute an offense in both
countries, then extradition is denied. See I. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 137 (discussing
the principle of double criminality). Acts that constitute the passive offenses are often
not prohibited in many countries, and they may be nonextraditable for that reason. See
C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 107 (noting that passive offenses are often
[VOL. 2:203
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pure political offense is generally nonextraditable because of the recog-
nized right of individuals to alter or abolish their government.33
The second category of political offenses, inspiring a plethora of in-
terpretations concerning the scope of the political offense, is the relative
political offense. The pure political offense only involves acts that are
political in nature, whereas the relative political offense includes ele-
ments of a common crime coupled with political purposes or motives.30
The addition of common crime elements dilutes the political character
of the offense, making attempts to classify the act as political for extra-
dition purposes more difficult.
C. RELATIVE POLITICAL OFFENSES UNDER THE POLITICAL OFFENSE
EXCEPTION
1. The Objective Test
The ambiguous nature of the relative political offense prompted
courts to employ different interpretations of the proper scope of the
political offense exception. The most restrictive interpretation focuses
solely on the objective act with complete disregard for the actor's mo-
tives.37 In In re Giovanni Gatti, a 1947 French case, the court applied
this restrictive interpretation to an extradition request for an individual
convicted in absentia of murdering a communist.38 Despite the seem-
ingly persuasive argument that the act was politically motivated, the
court approved extradition because the political character of the offense
emanated not from the offender's motive, but from the nature of the
rights injured.3" Therefore, under the objective test, a country will not
comply with an extradition request unless the nature of the injured
rights is political.40
not prohibited in many countries).
35. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (discussing the philosophical and
historical underpinnings of the political offense exception).
36. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 108 (using the term "relative"
to include all political offenses that are not "pure"); M. BAssiOUN1, WORLD PuBLIc
ORDER, supra note 18, at 383 (noting that in a relative political offense, ideological
motives prompt an act that constitutes a common crime).
37. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 120 (noting that the objective
approach to defining a political offense is rarely applied). The reason for the minimal
use of the objective theory is the requirement that in any given fact pattern, it is usu-
ally difficult to separate acts from the motives behind them. Id. at 121-22.
38. In re Giovanni Gatti, 14 I.L.R. 145 (1947), quoted in C. VAN DEN WIJN-
GAERT, supra note 10, at 121.
39. Id. (noting that the court applied a purely objective approach in deciding to
extradite the offender).
40. Id. at 122. This approach is problematic because it blurs the distinction be-
tween pure and relative offenses. If killing a member of a communist group is not
1987]
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2. The Motives Test
In direct contrast to the objective approach, some courts have fo-
cused solely on the offender's motives. 41 Thus, if the offender is politi-
cally motivated, the actions are not considered sufficient grounds for
extradition, regardless of the relationship to political motives or pur-
poses. 42 For example, in 1975, a French court denied a United States
extradition request for two Americans charged with air piracy, kidnap-
ping, and extortion because during the hijacking one of the defendants
demanded that the pilot fly the plane to Hanoi.4 3 Due to French gov-
ernment opposition to the American role in the Vietnam War, the ref-
erence to Hanoi convinced the French court that the hijackers were
politically motivated and within the parameters of the political offense
exception.44
3. The Swiss Test
The predominance or proportionality test, also known as the Swiss
test,45 balances the political motive or purpose of the offender against
the elements of common crime. The political offense exception is raised
considered political, then nothing short of a direct attack against a political institution
can qualify as a political offense under this test. Id. In addition, the objective test is
considered too formal because it fails to distinguish political crimes, as defined by the
objective test, committed for strictly personal motives. Id. For example, the assassina-
tion of a head of state is considered a political offense under the objective test because
of the nature of the rights injured. The objective test is applied in the same manner if
the motives behind a murder stem from a completely nonpolitical argument concerning,
for example, a gambling debt.
41. See id. (observing that in the majority of cases, French courts have focused on
the alleged offender's motives).
42. See id. at 122-23 (commenting that the focus on intent provides too much pro-
tection when a purely personal, yet political motive prompts a serious crime).
43. See E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 168-75 (1975) (discussing United States contentions that allegations of political
motives were insufficient to give rise to a political offense).
44. See Sofaer, supra note 3, at 15-16 (using this case as an example of the unde-
sirable effects of the political offense exception). Sofaer cites a second example support-
ing his contention that an overbroad application of the political offense exception may
have harmful results. Id. In 1973, five Americans-two of whom had escaped from jail
while serving sentences for murder and armed robbery-hijacked a domestic flight and
held the passengers for $1 million ransom. Id. A French court declined a United States
extradition request, stating that the hijackers' act was committed to escape racial seg-
regation and criminal charges brought as a product of political persecution. Id. at 17;
see also E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 124-25 (1976) (discussing the racial persecution the five would suffer if returned
for trial on the charges stemming from the hijacking).
45. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 126-32 (providing the origins
of the proportionality test); see also I. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 182 (discussing the
Swiss courts' adoption of the preponderance theory).
210 [VOL. 2:203
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only if the former outweighs the latter.' Under the Swiss test, the tak-
ing of life-because it is so extreme-is considered predominantly po-
litical and nonextraditable if the killing is of last resort.4
4. The Political Incidence Test
The final test of interpreting relative political offenses is the political
incidence test, currently used in the United States48 and Great Brit-
ain.49 The test was first formulated in In re Castioni,0 a case involving
an individual accused of killing an elected official during a popular up-
rising.51 The court found that the alleged acts were political crimes in-
cidental to and part of political disturbances."2 Three years later the
political incidence test was applied again in In re Meunier.3 This case
involved an anarchist responsible for bombings resulting in two
deaths." Using the political incidence test, the court approved extradi-
tion.55 The court noted that for an anarchist, the requirement of two or
more parties attempting to impose a government of choice upon the
other was absent, because the anarchist is the enemy of all govern-
ment.56 The political incidence test, like most theories enumerated
above, is also subject to divergent interpretations.5
46. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 126, 129 (stating that the
exception only applies if the offense is predominantly political); see also 1. SHEARER,
supra note 1, at 182 (describing the standard as whether, in a mixed common and
political offense, the political or the common elements preponderate); M. BASSiOtmJ,
WORLD PuBLC ORDER, supra note 18, at 403 (noting that the political element must
predominate over the ordinary criminal element).
47. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 130. Critics argue that the arbitrar-
iness of the predominance test makes it susceptible to manipulability. Id. at 131. The
predominance test relies on subjective evaluations rather than its presumed objective
standards. Id. at 132.
48. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the
political incidence test in American courts).
49. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 111-20 (discussing the history
of the political incidence theory and its applications in Great Britain, the United
States, and the Irish Republic); I. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 169-81 (discussing United
States and British interpretations of a political offense); S. BEDi, supra note 4. at 182
(observing that an offense, combined with a political disturbance, results in a relative
political offense).
50. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
51. Id. at 150; see also M. BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBuC ORDER, supra note 18, at
388 (providing Castioni as an example of a court applying the political incidence test).
52. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 152.
53. In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415 (involving a French extradition request).
54. Id.; see also C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 112 (citing Meunier as
an example of the British application of the political incidence test).
55. In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, 419.
56. Id.
57. See Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Kolczynski, [1954] 1 Q.B.
540 (applying the political incidence test when the act was not incidental to an upris-
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II. UNITED STATES LAW AND THE POLITICAL OFFENSE
EXCEPTION
Although the United States recognized an exception to extradition
early in its history, 8 United States case law on the political offense
exception did not develop until the late nineteenth century. 59 Since that
time, several decisions made in courts across the country have fash-
ioned the political incidence test.
A. ADOPTION OF THE POLITICAL INCIDENCE TEST
The seminal United States case embracing the political incidence
test, In re Ezeta,60 involved the Salvadoran government's extradition
request for five individuals accused of murder and robbery. The Cali-
fornia court denied extradition because the offense was directly related
to an ongoing conflict.81 The court noted that acts taken by military
personnel were "closely identified" with the rebellion "in an unsuccess-
ful attempt to suppress it."
'0 2
Two years later, in 1896, the United States Supreme Court ruled on
the political offense exception for the first and only time in Ornelas v.
Ruiz.6 3 In Ornelas, Mexican authorities sought the extradition of sev-
eral individuals charged with murder, arson, robbery, and kidnapping. 4
ing). In Regina, the British Government refused to surrender seven Polish seamen who
mutinied and brought the ship into an English port requesting asylum. Id. Although
the sailors' act was not incidental to any uprising, the British court refused to extradite
the men. Id. The court stated that the revolt of the crew was an effort to avoid prosecu-
tion for political offenses and therefore the offense was political. Id. at 551. The court
added, "if only for reasons of humanity [it is necessary] to give a wider and more
general meaning to the words we are now construing." Id.; see also C. VAN DEN WIJN-
GAERT, supra note 10, at 112 (inferring that the court manipulated the political inci-
dence test when applying it to the facts of Regina).
58. See supra note 24 (quoting Letter to Secretary of State Hoffman on the protec-
tion of political offenders).
59. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
case law on the political offense).
60. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 932, 974 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
61. See id. at 1002 (describing the conflict between Ezeta, then in power, and revo-
lutionary forces).
62. Id. The court also considered the relationship of the political character of the
offense to military law. Id. at 1005. See id. at 1000 (noting the limited relevance of
cases involving acts committed against a government because the instant situation in-
volved officials of the existing government committing the acts); Quinn v. Robinson,
783 F.2d 776, 800 n.24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986) (noting the
paradox when a government acts in furtherance of government policy while individuals
act in furtherance of an uprising).
63. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
64. Id. at 503. The offenses were covered by the extradition treaty then in force
between Mexico and the United States). Id.
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The alleged crimes were committed in a Mexican border town at ap-
proximately the same time as a rebellion.6 5 The Supreme Court recog-
nized the two-part requirement of existing revolutionary activity"0 and
an alleged criminal act as a part of the activity.67 Applying this test,
the Court found that the raid was committed, not as an act of revolu-
tion, but as an act of banditry, separate from the ongoing revolutionco
Thus, while the alleged banditry occurred contemporaneously with rev-
olutionary activity, the Court held that the criminal acts were extradit-
able because they were not incidental to or part of the political
uprising.6 9
Since Ornelas, United States courts have consistently used the politi-
cal incidence test to determine the applicability of the political offense
exception."0 Ornelas requires the satisfaction of both parts of the politi-
cal incidence test before a court can refuse to extradite. Courts have
further refined the criteria for meeting the two-part subtests in holding:
(1) that there must be an uprising or other violent political disturbance;
and (2) that the offense must be incidental to, in the course of, or in
furtherance of the uprising.
B. JUSTIFICATIONS
Proponents of the political incidence test justify use of the test, rea-
soning that the requirement of an uprising or other violent disturbance
comports with the underlying rationale of the political offense excep-
65. Id.
66. Id. at 511 (stating that the evidence indicated the existence of a revolutionary
movement).
67. Id. (reporting the District Court's record that the raid was part of a political
movement to overthrow the Mexican Government).
68. Id. The Supreme Court found that the District Court judge could not disturb
the findings of the Secretary of State. Id. The Secretary had concluded that any politi-
cal designs were negated when the individuals crossed the border with their booty in-
stead of advancing into Mexico. Id.
69. Id. at 511.
70. See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 796 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 271 (1986) (examining, applying, and approving the political incidence test); Esco-
bedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980) (pointing out that the Fifth
Circuit defines a political offense as an offense committed in the course of, and inciden-
tal to, a violent political disturbance and emphasizing that an offense does not assume
political character simply because a political motive is involved); Jimenez v. Ariste-
quieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that financial crimes are not political
when using the political incidence test); United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383,
393 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (applying the political incidence test to find that a political crime
was committed). But see Matter of Doherty by Government of the United Kingdom,
599 F. Supp. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (advocating that a two-part requirement is the
beginning of analysis and concluding that no act is political when it violates interna-
tional law).
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tion.7' It is the people's right to revolt against their government and
this right developed concomitantly with the political offense excep-
tion. 72 The right is implicitly collective and not for the use of isolated
individuals. 3 Consequently, the requirement of an uprising ensures
that a popular element74 is present and that individual actors are ineli-
gible for protection under the political offense exception.7 1
It is necessary, however, to clearly delineate the boundaries of the
requisite uprising. In Eain v. Wilkes, the court required "ongoing, or-
ganized parties" with "organized armies. ' ' 7' For the purpose of apply-
ing the political incidence test, the requisite uprising may not need to
meet the Seventh Circuit's prescribed level.77
An uprising is defined as "a usually localized act of popular violence
in defiance of an established government. '7 8 Accordingly, other courts
consider an uprising a revolt against one's own or an occupying govern-
ment.79 In Quinn v. Robinson, Judge Reinhardt determined that one
characteristic of an uprising was temporal and spatial limitation. 0
Therefore, an uprising can only exist when it is initiated by nationals in
the state of nationality.81 The second criterion, that a minimal connec-
tion exist between the acts and the uprising, applies solely to acts com-
mitted as part of the political uprising.82 This part of the incidence test
71. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 806-07 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 271 (1986) (discussing the uprising component and concluding that it requires no
significant modification).
72. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (discussing the philosophical un-
derpinnings of the political offense exception).
73. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (stating that the people
have the right to alter or abolish a government).
74. Pyle, supra note 17, at 90.
75. Id.
76. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 519 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981); see infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (discussing Eain v. Wilkes);
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 797 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986)
(stating that the United States view of what constitutes an uprising is stricter than the
British view); see also Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Kolczynski,
[1954] 1 Q.B. 540 (showing that the uprising requirement is manipulable, allowing
exception to extradition).
77. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 519 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981).
78. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1297 (9th ed. 1983).
79. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
271 (1986) (referring to a revolt against one's own or an occupying government as an
uprising); see also Pyle, supra note 17, at 90 (stating that courts have rejected invoca-
tion of the political offense exception when individuals or groups act without popular
support).
80. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271
(1986).
81. Id.
82. Pyle, supra note 17, at 90.
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prevents individuals from availing themselves of political offense pro-
tection when crimes are committed for personal reasons during a politi-
83cal uprising.
Recently, a California district court penned the final chapter in the
extradition of Andrija Artukovic when it denied his request for a writ
of habeas corpus." Artukovic was charged in Yugoslavia with ordering
the machine gun murders of several hundred men, women, and chil-
dren, while serving as the Croatian Minister of the Interior during
World War 11.85 Yugoslavia, pursuant to a treaty between the United
States and Serbia, requested the extradition of Artukovic.80 The court
noted the presence of political uprisings during the time in question,
but stated that Yugoslavia was required to demonstrate "a rational
nexus between the alleged crimes and the prevailing turmoil. '87 Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that the murders were not of political
character, but were ordered out of a desire for personal gain. 8
The judicial branch's application of the political incidence test to de-
termine political offenses is generally effective in light of the underlying
rationale behind the exception. A proper application of the political in-
cidence test can determine the validity of political offenses in a politi-
cally neutral manner without becoming mired in the various political
beliefs of the offender's ideological foray. The existence of an uprising
and the commission of incidental acts are relatively factual, apolitical
issues.8 9 Properly applied, the political incidence test does not force the
83. Id.
84. Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd sub nom.,
Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818, reh'g de-
nied, 348 U.S. 889 (1954), on remand sub nom., Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245
(S.D. Cal. 1956), affid sub nom., Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1957), vacated and remanded sub nom., United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383
(S.D. Cal. 1959), Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1982), Matter of Extradi-
tion of Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (denying Artukovic's request
for a writ of habeas corpus), Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986) (deny-
ing Artukovic's appeal for an emergency stay). Artukovic was extradited a few days
after his final appeal was denied. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1986, at A3, col. I.
85. See Matter of Extradition of Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370, 1373-74 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (describing crimes allegedly committed by Artukovic).
86. See Treaty of Extradition of 1901, October 25, 1901, United States-Serbia, 32
Stat. 1890, T.S. 406; see also Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 566-74 (9th Cir.
1954) (discussing the issue of state succession with relation to Serbia and Yugoslavia
and concluding that the extradition treaty between the United States and Yugoslavia
was valid).
87. Matter of Extradition of Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
88. Id. (noting that the mere occurrence of the acts during a time of turmoil was
not a sufficient connection to bring the incident within the political offense exception).
89. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 806-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 271 (1986) (evaluating the components and the policies behind the political inci-
dence test). The court in Quinn noted that the test developed from a concern for indi-
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magistrate to debate the legitimacy of the offender's motives or goals,
or the appropriateness of means employed to further his cause.90
B. MISAPPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL INCIDENCE TEST
Though in theory the political incidence test remains politically neu-
tral, in practice its neutrality depends upon the factfinder in the re-
quested state. If the magistrate misapplies the political incidence test
by improperly considering the goals of the actor, the political incidence
test begins to resemble the motives test.91 The motives test's major flaw
is that it tends not to examine whether the offender's motives were
truly political in nature, but whether the requested state is willing to
recognize the political motives of the offender as legitimate."2 Under
such a test there is the danger and temptation that in the United
States, under the political offense exception, an individual striving for
democracy might receive protection from extradition, while a person
working for the establishment of an authoritarian, totalitarian, theo-
cratic, or communist government may face extradition.9 3 By compari-
son, proper application of the political incidence test does not require
the factfinder to debate the legitimacy of the means or the goals of the
requested individual. The following two cases demonstrate the contrast
between the proper and improper application of the political incidence
test.
1. In re Mackin
In In re Mackin, a magistrate appointed by the District Court for
the Southern District of New York denied Great Britain's extradition
request for Desmond Mackin, a resident of Northern Ireland.94 Mackin
was sought in connection with the shooting of a British soldier on a
street in Belfast. He was accused of attempted murder, wounding with
viduals engaged in political activity and not from a desire to protect all politically moti-
vated violence. Id.
90. See Note, State Department Determination, supra note 12, at 159 (noting that
it is not within the province of a United States court to "pass judgment on the ideologi-
cal proximity of the requesting state to the ideal of American democratic
government").
91. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing the motives test).
92. Id.
93. Pyle, supra note 17, at 21-22.
94. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming the magistrate's decision
to deny the United Kingdom's request for extradition); see generally Note, In re
Mackin: Is the Application of the Political Offense Exception an Extradition Issue for
the Judicial or Executive Branch, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 565 (1981-1982) (discussing
the case of Desmond Mackin).
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intent to do grievous bodily harm, and possession of firearms and am-
munition with the intent to endanger life. 5 The magistrate found that
there was an uprising within the vicinity at the time of the alleged act,
and that the acts committed against the British soldier were incidental
to that uprising."' The court's determination did not require inquiry
into either the legitimacy of the uprising nor the appropriateness of the
means. The court in In re Mackin was therefore able to remain faithful
to the underlying principles of the political offense exception.
2. Eain v. Wilkes
In Eain v. Wilkes, the court failed to maintain the neutrality of the
political incidence test. 7 Abu Eain was accused of planting a bomb
that exploded in the marketplace in Tiberias, Israel, killing two people
and injuring more than thirty. 8 Eain contended, inter alia, that be-
cause he was a resident of the West Bank and a member of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO), the alleged crimes were political
in nature and accordingly fell within the political offense exception to
the extradition treaty between the United States and Israel., Narrowly
defining the uprising requirement of the political incidence test,200 the
court ignored the test's neutrality principles and distinguished between
cases involving "on-going, organized battles between contending ar-
mies" and those involving dispersed forces such as the PLO.20 1 Exceed-
ing the level of inquiry required by the incidence test, the court then
passed judgment on acceptable methods of revolution and rebellion,
concluding that the tactics of the PLO were generally unacceptable.102
The court further proceeded to judge the legitimacy of the goals of the
PLO and concluded that the PLO's desire to alter the social structure
95. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981).
96. Id. at 125 (concluding that the crimes in question were of a "political charac-
ter"). Those concerned that such decisions will result in the United States becoming a
haven for terrorists should note that Desmond Mackin was deported to Ireland in 1981.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1982 at A2, col. 3.
97. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
98. Id. at 507.
99. Id. Eain also contended that his alleged function within the PLO placed him
sufficiently within the scope of the political offense exception. Id. at 519.
100. Id. at 519 (discussing the criticisms of the political offense exception but con-
cluding that current law is flexible enough to avoid abuses).
101. Id.; see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807 (9th Cir.) (noting that the
PLO's tactics fell outside the political offense exception), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271
(1986).
102. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, at 519-20 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing modem
international terrorism from more conventional expressions of dissatisfaction with the
political structure of the world), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
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in the area was unacceptable.' 03 Returning to its application of the in-
cidence test, the court stated that the requisite political disturbance
permitting application of the political offense exception is limited to
"acts that disrupt the political structure of the state, and not the social
structure that established the government."'
10 4
These two examples illustrate contrasting applications of the political
incidence test. In re Mackin preserved the test's political neutrality, 00
while the court in Eain adopted additional restrictions that resembled
the elements of the motives test. 0 6 Since 1981, when the two cases
were decided, court decisions in the United States have been inconsis-
tent, adopting either the Eain or In re Mackin approach through vari-
ous interpretations. 0 7 Consequently, there is no trend in the courts
showing a preference for either rationale. At present, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has adopted the political incidence test with certain additional re-
strictions 10 8 while the Ninth Circuit has recently rejected those added
restrictions in favor of the traditional application of the two-prong
test. 09 The additional restrictions and the possibility that they exceed
the scope of the political incidence test are important considerations
when examining the Supplementary Treaty and its potential effect on
the treatment of political offenses.
103. See id. at 520 (explaining that if a violent political disturbance included de-
structive acts on civilian populations in an effort to destroy a state's political structure,
the United States would become a safe haven for terrorists).
104. Id. at 520-21.
105. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing the political inci-
dence test's application in In re Mackin).
106. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing the political inci-
dence test's application in Eain v. Wilkes).
107. See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), motion to dismiss
granted, 615 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (accepting a number of restrictions set
forth in Eain). Doherty, a PIRA member, was accused of attacking a convoy of British
soldiers. Id. at 272. The District Court for the Southern District of New York con-
cluded that although the political offense exception applied in this case, it would not
apply in cases involving bombing of public places, id. at 274, or violations of interna-
tional law. Id. The court also concluded that the acts of amorphous or fanatic groups,
without structure or clearly defined political objectives, would not be protected by the
political offense exception. Id. at 276. But see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807-
08 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986) (rejecting the Eain restrictions as
unnecessary). The Ninth Circuit noted that a primary concern of the court in Eain was
to keep the United States from becoming a haven for international terrorists. Through
proper application of the political incidence test and without resort to subjective and
judgmental considerations, this goal was achievable. Id. at 808.
108. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981);
see supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing the acceptance of the politi-
cal incidence test in Eain).
109. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271
(1986); see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the
political incidence test in Quinn).
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III. THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY BETWEEN THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES
A. TERMS AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE TREATY
Article V of the 1972 Extradition Treaty between the United States
and Great Britain n1 is similar to the political offense exception con-
tained in many of the extradition treaties signed by the United
States.111 The Supplementary Treaty between the United States and
Great Britain, however, substantially limits the political offense excep-
tion's application, specifying particular crimes which are not regarded
as offenses of political character."12 These crimes include air piracy,
110. Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, at 230. Article V states in pertinent part:
Extradition shall not be granted if...
(c) (i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the re-
quested party as one of a political character; or
(c) (ii) the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has been
made with a view to try to punish him for an offense of a political character.
Id.
111. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, art. V, 31
U.S.T. 5059, 5063-65, T.I.A.S. No. 9656 (stipulating that extradition shall not be
granted when the offense is political or of a political character); Extradition Treaty,
Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, art. 4(1)(iii), 27 U.S.T. 983, 988, T.I.A.S. No.
8237 (stipulating that extradition is not granted when the offense is political in
character).
112. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 1. The Supplementary Treaty
states in article I that:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following offenses shall
be regarded as an offense of a political character
(a) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature at the Hague on 16 December
1970;
(b) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Mon-
treal on 23 September 1971;
(c) an offense within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplo-
matic Agents, opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973;
(d) an offense within the scope of the International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979;
(e) murder;
(f) manslaughter;
(g) maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
(h) kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention, includ-
ing the taking of a hostage;
(i) the following offenses relating to explosives:
(1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious
damage to property, or
(2) conspiracy to cause such an explosion, or
(3) the making or possession of an explosive substance by a person who
intends either himself or through another person to endanger life or cause
serious damage to property;
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assassinations of diplomats, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, the use
of firearms to resist arrest, reckless endangerment, and attempts to
commit any of the enumerated crimes. 113
On July 17, 1985, President Reagan submitted the Supplementary
Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent. The President main-
tained that the Treaty provides a means to improve law enforcement
cooperation because it excludes serious offenses typically committed by
terrorists from the scope of the political offense exception. 114 Abraham
D. Sofaer, the Legal Advisor to the Department of State, testifying
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, expressed the de-
sire of the United States to avoid becoming a haven for terrorists who
use indiscriminate violence against citizens of other countries.'" Sofaer
added that the Supplementary Treaty was a valuable tool because
under its provisions, terrorists who "commit ...wanton acts of vio-
lence and destruction" are not immune from extradition merely for act-
ing to advance a political objective.
1 16
Sofaer cited further justification for the Supplementary Treaty after
comparing the provisions of the Supplementary Treaty with recent leg-
islative attempts at extradition reform.1 7 Sofaer commented that the
Supplementary Treaty was "more narrow, and carefully drawn" than
extradition reform legislation, that would apply to any nation having
extradition relations with the United States." 8 The underlying ration-
ale for the Supplementary Treaty was that the political offense excep-
tion had "no place in extradition treaties between stable democracies in
which the political system is available to redress legitimate grievances
(j) the following offenses relating to firearms or ammunition:
(1) the possession of firearms or ammunition by a person who intends
either through himself or through another person to endanger life; or
(2) the use of a firearm by a person with the intent to resist or prevent
the arrest or detention of himself or another person;
(k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard as
to whether the life of another would thereby be endangered;
(1) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
Id.
The revised version of the Supplementary Treaty approved by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee omits possession of firearms and conspiracy to commit any of the
included offenses from the list of offenses that shall not be considered of a political
character. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at A7, col. 4.
113. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at A7, col. 4.
114. Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan to the Senate, 21 WEEKLY
COMP. PRas. Doc. 1334 (July 17, 1985).
115. Sofaer, supra note 3, at 21.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 21.
118. Id. at 22.
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and the judicial process provides fair treatment."110 Sofaer also indi-
cated that the United States intended to negotiate similar agreements
with other nations meeting that criteria.120
B. CRITICISMS OF THE TREATY AND ITS JUSTIFICATIONS
1. Weakening Philosophical Underpinnings of the Political Offense
Exception
The Supplementary Treaty accomplishes an end that the United
States judiciary has carefully and artfully avoided through the applica-
tion of the political incidence test. In adopting the Supplementary
Treaty's negative definition of a political offense, the United States
does not recognize the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA)
means of effecting revolt, implying that only nonviolent forms of rebel-
lion and revolution are permissible. 21 Because the Supplementary
Treaty is bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, in addition to judging
the PIRA's means impermissible, the United States government has
also effectively adjudged the political goals of the PIRA impermissi-
ble.'22 Through the Supplementary Treaty, the United States seeks to
impose its standards of political conduct on other nations and popula-
tions despite the divergent social and political ideologies behind the in-
ternal political struggles.
2. Amending Current Extradition Process
In addition to countering the philosophical underpinnings of the po-
litical offense exception, the Supplementary Treaty weakens the frame-
work of extradition as codified under Title 18 of the United States
Code and developed through judicial precedent.12 3 Section 3184 of Ti-
tle 18 governs the extradition of individuals from the United States. 24
As a prerequisite to extradition, section 3184 requires a judge or mag-
istrate to determine whether an individual is extraditable.125 In making
this determination, a judge or magistrate must consider the evidence of
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (discussing Eain and the de-
bate concerning the acceptable methods of revolt).
122. See M. BAssiouNi, UNITED STATES LAW AND PRAcTicE, supra note 2, at § 1-
1 (discussing the United States extradition process and cases involving the extradition
of a foreign offender).
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criminality and the provisions of the Treaty. 2 ' If these requirements
are satisfied, the extradition request is certified to the Secretary of
State. 2 7 The Secretary of State then has the discretion to surrender
the individual certified pursuant to section 3184.128 Under section 3184,
the person whose extradition is sought benefits from a process that re-
quires the approval of two branches of government prior to extradition.
Each branch, however, has different interests to protect when consider-
ing an extradition request. An appreciation of these interests is impera-
tive to an understanding of a major shortcoming of the Supplementary
Treaty.
The executive branch, through the State Department, is responsible
for conducting foreign relations between the United States and the in-
ternational geopolitical community. 29 Consequently, the refusal to re-
turn a technically extraditable individual based on differences in policy
between the United States and the requesting state is a powerful politi-
cal tool of the executive branch. 30 Accordingly, it is in the interest of
the United States to fulfill an ally's extradition request and preserve
friendship and alliance with that nation, regardless of its ideological
orientation.13'
This paradigm makes the judiciary's role in the extradition process
important. Under section 3184, the judiciary has the duty to ensure the
protection of the individuals' rights, insulating the process from geopo-
litical considerations.3 2 Under the Supplementary Treaty, the role of
the courts is reduced to that of rubber stamping extradition warrants
after merely determining the identity of the accused and the sufficiency
of the evidence.' Application of the political incidence test is entirely
preempted with respect to the crimes enumerated under the Treaty.
The Treaty thus constitutes the legislative equivalent of a motives test,
directed specifically at Irish Republican Army (IRA) activities. For ex-
126. Id. at § 3186. The executive branch does not, however, have the power to
extradite an offender in the absence of a magistrate's certification. Id.
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
128. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1986, at A3, col. 1 (suggesting that an underlying
reason for Artukovic's long delayed extradition was the executive and judicial
branches' pervasive reluctance to return him to a communist country).
129. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (noting the recent proposed
reform legislation and the State Department's interest in revising the current extradi-
tion process).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
131. Pyle, supra note 17, at 17-18.
132. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 8 (reprinting the revised political of-
fense exception in the Supplementary Treaty).
133. See supra notes 94-96, 105-09 and accompanying text (discussing the applica-
tion of the political incidence test in In re Mackin).
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ample, if considered today, a judge or magistrate would have no choice
but to certify the extradition warrant of Desmond Mackin. Under the
Supplementary Treaty, Mackin's offenses are no longer of political
character.8 4 The fact that his alleged crimes were committed in con-
nection with a political uprising in Belfast would not protect Mackin
from extradition.
Under the terms of the Supplementary Treaty, the executive branch
has the ability to undermine the principles of the political offense ex-
ception. The forms of rebellion commonly used in past uprisings to re-
volt, i.e., terrorist tactics, are now specifically excluded from the politi-
cal offense exception.
The executive branch has two choices after an individual is certified
by the judiciary for extradition. First, it might decide not to extradite,
based on the authority delegated to the executive branch under Title
18.135 This approach is unlikely, however, because the United States is
committed to discouraging terrorism and is intent on remaining a
strong ally of Great Britain. Second, the executive branch might extra-
dite the offender to Great Britain. Taking this action, the United States
effectively passes judgment on the legitimacy of the revolt in Northern
Ireland and corrupts the political offense exception.
The United States would benefit from preserving, rather than dilut-
ing the judiciary's role in the extradition process. In addition to the
safeguards provided for the requested individual, the judiciary also per-
forms an important role of insulating the executive branch against both
external and internal pressures. 138 The executive branch could effec-
tively avoid the pressure that a requesting party exerts if the judiciary
determines that the individual was nonextraditable as a matter of law.
This result leaves no discretion to the Secretary of State concerning the
question of surrendering the individual. The judiciary's role might also
insulate the executive branch from political pressure concerning indi-
viduals who have committed an offensive act, but do not qualify for
extradition under United States law. Therefore, in addition to protect-
ing the individual, there are additional reasons for preserving the role
of the judiciary in the extradition process. In response to problems in
applying the political offense exception, critics have suggested further
modification of the exception.
134. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
the political incidence test in Eain).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1982).
136. See C. VAN DEN VIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 133-62 (discussing the loop-
holes created by the negative approach to political offenses).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE
EXCEPTION
Critics contend that while the policies behind the political offense
exception are sound, loopholes in the political incidence test allow ter-
rorists to escape prosecution by invoking the exception. 137 Two recom-
mendations have been proposed to remedy this perceived problem. The
first is the abolition of the political offense exception."8' This proposal is
based on the belief that the political offense exception developed largely
as a reaction against tyrannical governments of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.13 9 Because democratic institutions have replaced
many of these governments, the underlying justifications for the excep-
tion are groundless.1 40 The ballot box now enables the citizens to exer-
cise influences making revolutions unnecessary.
14 1
The proposal to abolish the political offense exception, however, does
not consider situations in which the democratic government is unre-
sponsive to citizen's needs. For example, the United States pursued an
extradition treaty with the Phillipines that limited the political offense
exception's availability at a time when Ferdinand Marcos was oppress-
ing all opposition. 14  During that time, the United States government
continued to express its support for the democratic Marcos government,
while no opportunity for the electorate to express its voice existed.1
43
The fact that democratic institutions have replaced the tyrannical
governments does not mitigate the justifications for the political offense
exception. Although the exception developed as a reaction to tyrannical
137. Sofaer, supra note 3, at 21.
138. Epps, The Validity of the Political Exception on Extradition Treaties in An-
glo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61 (1979) (concluding that the po-
litical offense exception has outlived its usefulness and needlessly hampers harmonious
and pragmatic international relations).
139. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
the political offense exception).
140. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 18-23 (discussing the rise of
democratic governments in opposition to despotic regimes); Quinn v. Robinson, 783
F.2d 776, 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986) (noting that some com-
mentators contend that the exception only guarantees the right to rebel against tyranni-
cal government).
141. Sofaer, supra note 3, at 22 (stating that the political offense exception has no
place in extradition treaties between stable democracies because the political system is
available to redress legitimate grievances).
142. See LandXe & Hooley, Aquino Takes Charge, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1087-1107
(1986) (surveying the state of the Phillipines as Marcos's legacy ended).
143. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1986, at A14, col. I (discussing the Reagan Admin-
istration's attempts to prevent Congress from cutting aid to the Philippines); Wash.
Post, Feb. 6, 1986, at A15, col. 1 (describing the strategic interest of the United States
in the Philippines); Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1985, at Al, col. 1 (discussing the problems
for United States policy in light of the Philippines situation).
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governments,1 " its justification is much broader in that the political
offense exception is based on respect for the right of self-determina-
tion.1 5 Taking these considerations into account, the proposal to abol-
ish the political offense exception is not appropriate.
The second recommendation proposed to eliminate loopholes in the
political offense exception concerns a negative definition of a political
offense.1 46 The Supplementary Treaty contains an example of a nega-
tive definition of a political offense,1 47 enumerating actions that are not,
by definition, a political offense. The negative definition approach re-
quires an examination of the qualifications that characterize acts as
nonpolitical according to the Supplementary Treaty. The enumerated
crimes not considered political are "specified, wanton acts of violence
and destruction" typically committed by terrorists.148 The included of-
fenses range from aircraft hijacking to murder .14 This approach is too
arbitrary, however, because of the random selection of excludable
crimes. Moreover, this approach is not necessary for the exclusion of
terrorist or violent activity from the political offense exception 15 0 be-
cause a terrorist's use of indiscriminant violence is not incidental to any
uprising, as required by the political incidence test.1"1
A different use of the negative definition of political offenses avoids
the drawbacks of using the Supplementary Treaty. Instead of compos-
ing an arbitrary list of "depoliticized" offenses, 15 2 the definition of po-
litical offenses should exclude international crimes. 5 3 International
144. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
the political offense exception).
145. See The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776) (guaranteeing the
people the right to alter or abolish government); U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (citing
respect for equal rights and self-determination of peoples); U.N. CHARTER art. 55,
para. I (noting respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples).
146. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 133-62 (discussing the nega-
tive approach which involves exceptions to the political offense exception); M. B.As-
SIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 18, at 416-25 (noting exceptions to the
political offense exception).
147. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 8, at art. I (stipulating that certain
offenses shall not be regarded as having a political character).
148. Sofaer, supra note 3, at 3.
149. See supra note 112 (providing the complete text).
150. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 134. The negative definition, or
"depoliticizing" approach is based on a legal fiction which ignores the impossibility of
advance determination concerning political character. Id.
151. See supra notes 82-88 (discussing the requirement that the act be incidental
to an uprising).
152. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 133-35.
153. See id. at 139-58 (discussing the question of whether international crimes are
subject to extradition regardless of political character); M. BAssIOuNI, WORLD PuBLC
ORDER, supra note 18, at 416-29 (concluding that international crimes cannot fall
within the political offense exception); see M. BAssiOUKNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
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crimes are acts that are deemed crimes under existing international
conventions.les The basis for excluding international crimes from the
definition of political offenses is that those crimes "should not go un-
punished and the perpetrators of such crimes should be prosecuted and
punished as 'enemies of mankind.' ,,5
One example of an international crime is genocide. 15 Article 7 of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide provides that genocide is not considered a political offense for ex-
tradition purposes.1 17 Consequently, states who have ratified this Con-
vention cannot refuse to extradite someone accused of genocide on the
grounds that the offense was political. 158
Several of the Supplementary Treaty's enumerated offenses are con-
sidered international crimes.1 59 For example, the Supplementary Treaty
states that offenses within the scope of an international convention on
airplane hijacking are not regarded offenses of political character.60
International crimes, as evidenced by international convention and cus-
tomary international law, can limit the use of the political offense defi-
nition. International crimes differ in two ways from other unacceptable
offenses enumerated in the Supplementary Treaty. First, many nations
reject international crimes as unacceptable conduct." Second, because
acts constituting international crimes are widely rejected, all extradi-
tion treaties could include provisions on the crimes. This would avoid
the abuse of extradition by countries that differ on what activity and
groups deserve political protection. 62 These differences would ensure
equitable application of the political offense exception' 63 consistent with
LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 49-106 (1980) [hereinafter M. BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE] (discussing a proposed standard for interna-
tional crimes).
154. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 153, at 40. Inter-
national crimes may also include acts which are deemed international crimes pending
international conventions before the United Nations where the adoption is impending.
Id.
155. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 140.
156. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/181, at 174 (1948).
157. Id.
158. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 140.
159. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 8, at art. l(a)-(d).
160. Id. at art. 1(a).
161. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 10, at 140 (noting that international
crimes should not go unpunished); M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE,
supra note 153, at 40 (requiring international crimes to be established by multilateral
conventions).
162. See Pyle, supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the need of a uniform standard for




the justifications for the exception'" and the political incidence test.',,
CONCLUSION
The political offense exception is the product of our respect for the
right to change one's government. Application of the political incidence
test is an effective apolitical means of determining a political offense.
Any limitations on the political offense exception must remain consis-
tent with the underpinnings of the exception.
The Supplementary Treaty limits the availability of the political of-
fense exception through the use of a negative definition. The Supple-
mentary Treaty's negative definition is too arbitrary because it denies
the Provisional Irish Republican Army the option of exercising many of
the most common means of revolution.
An acceptable limitation of the political offense exception is the pre-
clusion of international crimes from being considered political. Several
international crimes are included among the Supplementary Treaty's
enumerated offenses. The other enumerated offenses arbitrarily and
unacceptably limit the political offense exception. It is for these reasons
that the Supplementary Treaty fails as an acceptable means of combat-
ting terrorism.
164. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (describing the justifications for
a political offense exception).
165. See supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying ra-
tionale for the political incidence test).
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